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I. INTRODUCTION

Incorporating the Continental philosophical tradition of hermeneutics into legal scholarship appears to be a project relevant only
to a few jurisprudes locked away in the uppermost reaches of the ivory
tower. Many scholars undoubtedly would argue that the tradition and
focus of twentieth-century German philosophy is far removed from the
troubling interpretive issues that arise in the American legal system,
regardless of any interesting parallels or comparisons that might be
*
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drawn., From this perspective, the renewed attention to hermeneutical philosophy by legal scholars is viewed as just one of an increasing
number of esoteric, intellectual cul-de-sacs that have diverged from
the boulevard of traditional jurisprudence.
This not-so-hypothetical attitude toward hermeneutics is interesting for the very reason that it is erroneous. Those who argue that
contemporary philosophical hermeneutics holds little practical significance for legal practice demonstrate that they are unmindful of the
genealogy of the traditional principles of legal interpretation that they
hold so dear. The publication in 1837 of Francis Lieber's Legal and
PoliticalHermeneutics2 was an important contribution to the effort to
define principles of interpretation that could justify and guide the
newly created American practice of written constitutionalism. Lieber,
a native of Germany, related his knowledge of German hermeneutical
philosophy to the political and legal questions facing the young republic.3 Lieber's attempt to describe a science of textual interpretation
that would ensure rule-governed consistency in politics and adjudication helped to formulate the traditional views of interpretation
espoused by judges and theorists during the past century. 4 The
nineteenth-century hermeneutical tradition in Continental philosophy
1. I purposely narrow the "Continental philosophical tradition of hermeneutics" to 'German
philosophy."
Leading German philosphers of the past two centuries, including Friedrich
Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, have principally
shaped contemporary hermeneutical philosophy. Although Paul Ricoeur is French by birth, his
hermeneutical philosophy is perhaps best characterized as "German" in this regard. French
structuralist and poststructuralist philosophy represents an opposing strand of Continental
philosophy. Jacques Derrida, the leading post-structural theorist, regards his work not as a
development of the hermeneutical tradition, but as a subversion of hermeneutics.
2. Francis Lieber, Legal and PoliticalHermeneutics(F.H. Thomas & Co., 3d ed. 1880).
3. Specifically, Lieber's work replicated the tensions between the efforts of philosopher
Friedrich Schleiermacher to outline a general hermeneutics and the traditional hermeneutical
"fixation on words, contexts of use, and authorial intent." James Farr, The Americanization of
Hermeneutics: Francis Lieber's Legal and Political Hermeneutics, in Gregory Leyh, ed., Legal
Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice83, 88 (U. Cal., 1992) ("Legal Hermeneutics'). In The
Americanization of Hermeneutics, Farr describes Lieber's important contribution to American
legal practice. See id. at 98. See also Paul D. Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law
Teaching: The PoliticalEthics of FrancisLieber, 42 J. Legal Educ. 339 (1992). The significance of
Schleiermacher's philosophy for contemporary hermeneutics is described in Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Truth and Method 184-97 (Crossroads, 2d rev. ed. 1989) (Joel Weinsheimer and Donald
G. Marshall, trans.).
4. In the Preface to the enlarged edition, Lieber conjectures that everyone would agree that
principles of interpretation are necessary to ensure "the exact administration of the laws," and
that these "immutable principles and fixed rules for interpreting and construing [laws] should be
generally acknowledged, or if they exist already, in a scattered state, should be gathered and
clearly represented, so that they may establish themselves along with the laws, as part and
branch of the common law of free countries." Lieber, Legal and PoliticalHermeneutica at viii
(cited in note 2). Paul Carrington argues that "Lieber was the first American to apply the
techniques of literary criticism to law" as part of his effort to define the principles of legal
interpretation. Carrington, 42 J. Legal Educ. at 357. See also id. at 362, 383-85.
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has had an enduring effect on American legal theory and practice
through Lieber's scholarship. No sound reason exists to reject out of
hand the lessons that contemporary hermeneutics might hold.
Contemporary hermeneutical thought is too important to allow
legal scholars simply to cull its fancy jargon with the intent of adding
some sparkle to familiar and ossified jurisprudential debates. The
transformation of hermeneutics in this century has generated excitement among philosophers precisely because this transformation has
the liberating potential of presenting traditional problems in a new
light, whether they be problems of theology, history, literary criticism,
or aesthetics. The growing number of legal scholars exploring the
themes of contemporary hermeneutics do so with equal excitement;
their aim is to rethink traditional jurisprudential debates and to
reveal more faithfully the phenomenology of legal practice. Contemporary hermeneutics is especially relevant to the legal profession,
whose practice reveals a commitment to the centrality of interpretation but also an awareness that interpretation cannot be cabined as
a set of procedures or methods without obscuring the inherent connections of law, morals, politics, and history.
Gregory Leyh has edited a volume of essays commissioned "to
examine the intersections between contemporary legal theory and the
foundations of interpretation 5 as explored in contemporary hermeneutics. The essays are diverse and multidisciplinary, but each
sheds light on perplexing issues of legal interpretation that have
exhausted commentators in recent years. The contributors share a
broad agreement that we must reject the picture of law as an autonomous, insulated discourse and instead must regard legal discourse
as one of many interrelated practices rooted in our character as interpretive beings.
Each contributor addresses the central concerns defined by the
leading philosopher of hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer: What are
"the irreducible conditions of human understanding" and what do
these conditions tell us about the grounds of judgment?" As Leyh
relates in his Introduction, Gadamer explores how we reconstitute
meaningful traditions as part of an ongoing interpretive relation.
Gadamer views legal practice as an exemplary form of interpretive
activity that reveals a great deal about how we acquire knowledge,
but he also asserts that traditional jurisprudence misunderstands this
activity.7 Leyh notes that Gadamer defines our interpretive relation
5.
6.
7.

Legal Hermeneutica at xi (cited in note 3).
Id. at xii.
Gadamer, Truth and Method at 324-41 (cited in note 3).
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in a manner that acknowledges our experience of critique and change,
even while emphasizing our inherence in tradition:
Hermeneutical thinking does not produce pat answers or easy solutions
to difficult legal problems. Hermeneutics neither supplies a method for correctly reading texts nor underwrites an authoritative interpretation of any
given text, legal or otherwise. . . . It is worth noting, however, that the
activity of questioning and adopting a suspicious attitude toward authority is
at the heart of hermeneutical discourse. Hermeneutics involves confronting
the aporias that face us, and it attempts to undermine, at least in partial
ways, the calm assurances transmitted by the received views and legal orthodoxies.8

Contemporary (that is, post-Gadamerian) hermeneutics suggests that
it is possible to view law as politics without succumbing to nihilism,
and that it is possible to accept deconstructive critique within legal
practice without abandoning all notions of truth.
Leyh would have greatly assisted legal scholars if he had provided a more substantial Introduction identifying these themes.
Leyh's omission is understandable considering the excellent essays
that, taken together, develop many of the important connections
between contemporary hermeneutics and legal practice. Nevertheless,
the inevitability of the "hermeneutical circle" suggests that a more
substantive Introduction would have been appropriate. 9 Gadamer's

philosophical hermeneutics, and the debates that it has engendered,
are only now being examined in American legal scholarship.10 Additionally, hermeneutic philosophers are removed from the intricacies
and practical significance of contemporary issues in legal interpretation. Leyh's interdisciplinary endeavor would have been better

8. Legal Hermeneuticsat xvii-xviii (cited in note 3).
9. The famous 'problem" of the hermeneutical circle, the recognition that interpretation is
not based on bedrock, but rather is dynamic, is revealed by the fact that a person is unable to
understand a particular aspect of a text without relating it to the text as a whole, although the
text as a whole can be understood only by understanding its particulars.
10. Detailed examinations of Gadamer's philosophy in the legal literature include William
Y. Eskridge, Gadamer/StatutoryInterpretation,90 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1990); David C. Hoy,
Interpretingthe Law: Hermeneutical and PoststructuralistPerspectives, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 135
(1985); David C. Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/NonoriginalismDistinction,
15 N. Ky. L. Rev. 479 (1988); Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn
in Jurisprudence, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 661 (1991); Francis J. Mootz III, Legal Classics: After
Deconstructingthe Legal Canon, 72 N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming April 1994); Francis J. Mootz Ill,
Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Obvious Is Plausible,61 Tenn. L. Rev.
(forthcoming Fall 1993); Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possiblein a Postmodern World?,
68 Wash. L. Rev. 249 (1993); Francis J. Mootz IH, The OntologicalBasis of Legal Hermeneutics: A
Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas dnd Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L.
Rev. 523 (1988); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship,
80 Cal. L. Rev. 889 (1992).
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framed had he first provided a context for the "conversation about
legal hermeneutics" that the essays embody.,,
This minor criticism aside, the volume is an excellent addition
to the literature. The essays uniformly provide rewarding reading for
scholars, and many of the essays are suitable reading for a jurisprudence seminar. Although Gadamer's view of interpretation as
something other than a rule-governed, methodologically defined
practice figures prominently in the volume, Leyh selected the essays
12
to reveal the contested nature of many issues raised by Gadamer.
The essays do not define a single strategy of legal interpretation so
much as they delineate the issues of concern and suggest a more productive vocabulary for addressing these issues.
Leyh organizes the essays into five chapters. The volume
begins with two essays designated as General Perspectives and concludes with a Commentary by Stanley Fish. As suggested by the title,
the body of the volume is separated into three parts: History, Theory,
and Practice. This organizational approach is ironic, given the
important lesson of contemporary hermeneutics that it is illegitimate
to regard theory, practice, and history as separate and unrelated
modalities, but the organization permits readers unfamiliar with the
literature to focus on major themes. This review follows Leyh's
general organization by incorporating the General Perspective essays
and Fish's Commentary into separate discussions of History, Theory,
and Practice. I do not describe, much less critique, all of the subtle
and diverse perspectives contained within the volume, nor do I
attempt to disguise my bias in favor of Gadamer's hermeneutical
approach. By necessity I limit my review and critical appraisal to the
broad themes shared by the contributors. By conviction I defend the

11.

Legal Hermeneutic8at xvii (cited in note 3). Leyh adopts a properly humble posture by

suggesting that answers to the questions of what philosophical hermeneutics is and what
contribution it can make to legal interpretation are always tentative conclusions in an ongoing
conversation. Id. at xvii-xviii. However, those seeking to join the conversation would benefit from
an admittedly simplified outline of the paths this conversation has taken. For helpful overviews
of the history and significance of contemporary hermeneutics, the reader should consult the

excellent, though somewhat lengthy, introduction by Kurt Mueller-Vollmer in Kurt MuellerVollmer, ed., The HermeneuticsReader 1-53 (Continuum, 1989), and the succinct presentation by

Joel Weinsheimer in Joel Weinsheimer, PhilosophicalHermeneutics and Literary Theory 1-23
(Yale U., 1991).

For a good description of Gadamer's central themes and their relationship to

contemporary philosophy, see David E. Linge, Editor's Introduction, in Hans-Georg Gadamer,
PhilosophicalHermeneutica xi (U. Cal., 1976).
12. '[Not only do the contributors to this volume question the merits of the view that law is
rule.governed in some strong sense, asking instead what it means to talk hbout law as rules; they
also interrogate legal hermeneutics itself, probing critically to locate the ground on which it
purports to stand." Legal Hermeneuticsat xii (cited in note 3).

VANDERBILT LAW REVEW

[Vol. 47:115

general contours of the Gadamerian approach, primarily against the
challenges issued by Professor Fish.
II. HISTORY
The relationship between hermeneutics and history is multifaceted. At the most obvious level, philosophical hermeneutics has its
own defining intellectual history. Gadamer expressly describes his
philosophy as an extension of Martin Heidegger's efforts to rebut the
Enlightenment conception of knowledge after German romanticism
failed to accomplish this task.1 3 The relationship between hermeneutics and history, however, runs much deeper. On one hand,
historical inquiry necessarily is interpretive inasmuch as the historian
always is guided by her interests and prejudices and can never simply
describe the "facts" of the past. On the other hand, all interpretive
activities take place against the backdrop of historically defined,
meaningful social practices. Although the ideal of law as a rational
discourse distinct from political and social pressures is a powerful
image, it is betrayed when we explore how our conceptions of legal
dialogue have developed in response to multifaceted historical forces.
One of Gadamer's principal hermeneutical themes is the historicity of
all understanding, including legal understanding. Attuned to the
historical character of understanding, the legal scholar, in an effort to
free up current legal dialogue, is in a position to trace, and to some
extent unravel, the ideology embedded in traditional legal theory.
Several contributors to the volume explore these various ways in
which history and hermeneutical practice are intertwined.
Peter Goodrich traces orthodox conceptions of legal practice to
14
the birth of modern legal method in seventeenth-century England.
As described by Goodrich, English common law was formalized in
response to contingent social pressures rather than as a result of
developments internal to legal practice. Under the influence of Scholasticism, the "disparate strands of the legal tradition" were rationalized in jurisprudential writings that emphasized law as a univocal

13. See Gadamer, Truth and Method at 173-218 (cited in note 3); Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Text and Interpretation, in Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds., Dialogue and
Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter 21, 21-23 (S.U.N.Y., 1989).
14. Peter Goodrich, Ar Bablativa: Ramism, Rhetoric, and the Genealogy of English
Jurisprudence, in Legal Hermeneutics at 43 (cited in note 3). Goodrich does not pretend to
objectify history from the privileged posture of the present. Instead, Goodrich employs Foucault's
practice of genealogical inquiry by tracing "the contingent descent, the chance affiliations, and the

alien forms from which specific, singular objects of discourse are formed.! Id. at 73 n.16.
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discursive logic, "an empire of truth supported by a veridical language
or orthodoxy that was peculiar to the law alone."15 With this development, legal practice came to rest on a binary justification similar to
that supporting theology: the power of the unwritten word rooted in
an ancient communal tradition of the common law coupled with the
authority of esoteric methods of exegesis carried out by a professional
elite. Continuing pressures to reduce the law to a clearly stated vernacular language embodied in accessible and stable texts were rebuffed by legal professionals who claimed that legal reasoning and
argumentation were special skills enabling them to mediate the
tension between the originary sacred word and the meaning of the
written legal text.16 Goodrich illustrates a powerful theme with his
historical inquiry into the foundation of legal hermeneutics. The ideal
of a definitive legal discourse does not flow from the nature of "law"; it
is the result of particular historical forces.
James Farr carries this story forward in the American venue,
where the existence of a written constitution rendered particularly
important the need to formalize legal reasoning as a method for stabilizing the contestable meaning of governing texts.1 7 Farr emphasizes
the important impact of Francis Lieber's Legal and Political Hermeneutics, which was published at a time when the idea of a written
constitution was still subject to debate and when political conceptions
were in transition in response to positivist and utilitarian influences.18
Lieber proposed a scientific approach to interpretation, but he did not
succeed in segregating legal decisionmaking from the powerful
influences of social conflict. Farr exposes the contradictory impulses
in Lieber's supposed science of interpretation, exemplified by Lieber's
simultaneous commitment to the author's intent as the one true
meaning of a text and to the importance of incorporating common
sense, good faith, and the public welfare in every interpretation.1 9
Nevertheless, over time the American experience levelled the rich
tension of English jurisprudence to a vision of legal dogmatics
supplying the correct answers to questions about the meaning of the
15.

Id. at44.
16. "Only those who hold the key to tradition and guard the unwritten meanings can
properly determine whether or not the text is to be taken in its 'Plain signification' or whether it
is rather to be understood in an esoteric sense that accords more accurately with the hidden and
immemorial reason of the oldest and most excellent of all laws." Id. at 69.
17. Farr, The Americanization of Hermeneutics, in Legal Hermeneutics at 83 (cited in note
3).
18.. See id. at 98; Carrington, 42 J. Legal. Educ. at 362 (cited in note 3).
19. Lieber's commitment to a republican vision of politics explains his hesitancy to offer a
truly abstract, scientific account of interpretation. See Carrington, 42 J. Legal Educ. at 339 (cited
in note 3).
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Constitution. The failure of this dogmatic project has resulted in our
contemporary jurisprudential anxiety.
The essays by Goodrich and Farr chart our present predicament in a way that puts current jurisprudential trends into context.
For example, Professor Thomas Grey's long-standing effort to rehabilitate the legitimacy of an unwritten, fundamental constitutional law is
an attempt to recapture the more diverse conceptions of law arising
from the English common-law experience without surrendering the
reasoned articulation of the written Constitution's meaning.20 But any
such strategy is insufficient once we recognize that our conceptions of
law are not grounded on any bedrock tradition; the English experience, no less than American textualism, is the product of historical
chance and social contingency. The jurisprudential dilemma posed by
the collapse of traditional pictures of legal practice is now quite familiar. Either we invite legal nihilism by acknowledging that legal practice irretrievably is the product of an ungrounded social flux, or we
cling to law's rhetorical posturing as a distinct reasoned discourse
despite the implausibility of such a position. The important contribution of historically attuned hermeneutical inquiry is to dissolve this
dilemma.
Fred Dallmayr's essay answers the criticism that hermeneutics
is an invitation to nihilistic arbitrariness by exploring the historical
development of the doctrine of the rule of law.21 Dalimayr argues that
the political struggle to implement rule-governance is not undermined
by the hermeneutical thesis that all understanding is a historical
project. Although the interpretive insularity of traditional legal dogmatics ignores our hermeneutical situation and must be discarded, we
are not thereby consigned to surrender to arbitrary rule. Dallmayr
recounts the history of the doctrine of the rule of law, but his theme is
historical in a more important sense. Dallmayr argues that the historical character of interpretation permits us to resuscitate rule-governance in the face of nihilistic challenges.
Dallmayr links current apprehensions about the possibility of
the rule of law to an aporia first acknowledged in ancient Greece: the
competing and apparently irreconcilable claims of universal natural
20. See Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution,64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 211
(1988); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitutionas Scripture,37 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1984); Thomas C. Grey,
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
Stan. L. Rev. 843 (1978); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L.
Rev. 703 (1975). For a critique of Grey's thesis, see Mootz, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. (forthcoming Fall
1993) (cited in note 10).
21. Fred Dalmayr, Hermeneuticsand the Rule of Law, in Legal Hermeneutics at 3 (cited in
note 3).
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law and positive human law. Modern legal theory rejects the idea of
substantive natural law ("material law") in favor of the positivist
thesis that law is an autonomous and rational discourse that may be
practiced independently of communal efforts to define the good life.22
However, the attempt to segregate law from the influence of ongoing
substantive politics has invited the blistering post-Nietzschean deconstructive critique of the possibility for obtaining objective and uniform
interpretations even of the most formal, stylized discourse.2 We have
come to recognize that the "more normativity is formalized and elevated above contingencies, the more its content appears in need of
interpretive retrieval and assessment."24 All attempts to define the
rule of law in positive law terms divorced from substantive notions of
the public good have failed; the might of state power always implicates the right of the law.
Dallmayr contends that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics
avoids this apparent impasse. Gadamer stresses that understanding
is always a historical project of rearticulating the tradition in response
to the practical demands of the present. We understand a legal rule
only by means of practical exegesis: understanding and application
are a unified act. By conjoining rule-knowledge and rule-application,
Gadamer emphasizes that a rule is never something given in the past
and then later applied to a problem in the future. Rather, a rule
emerges in the resettling of tradition within our present context. 25
Dallmayr argues from this perspective that rule-governance is possible once we recharacterize it as the prudent elaboration of a historically situated common reasonableness. Consequently, modern society
must repair "deep ethnic, economic, or other fissures" and alleviate the

22. "By solidifying into a doctrine, rule-governance or the rule of law also underwent a
subtle change: namely, in the direction of a steady formalization and legalization .... In earlier
formulations law and lawfulness were still closely linked with notions of the common good and
thereby with broader substantive concerns. Id. at 9.
23. Dallmayr notes that Nietzsche's "iconoclastic inquiries" challenged the notion that a
positive rule could be understood objectively in a manner that permitted uniform application. Id.
at 12. "Nietzsche in the end arrived at an agonal perspectivism, a view of reality as refracted into
a multitude of conflicting construals and interpretations." Id. at 13. Phillipe Nonet offers a
detailed indictment of Nietzsche's nihilism as a generative influence on legal positivism in Phillipe
Nonet, What Is Positive LawO, 100 Yale L. J. 667 (1990).
24. Dallmayr, Hermeneutic8and the Rule of Law, in Legal Hermeneuticsat 13 (cited in note
3).
25. Gadamer expressly defines understanding as application: "[A]pplication is neither a
subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the phenomenon of understaiding, but codetermines
it as a whole from the beginning....
[Application does] not consist in relating some pregiven

universal to the particular situation." Gadamer, Truth andMethod at 324 (cited in note 3).
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"widespread sense of corruption, unfairness, and inequity"2 in order to
sustain the common reasonableness essential to the rule of law.
Although legal interpretation inevitably is a political event
under Dallmayr's definition, it does not devolve into a radically free
application of a traditional text by a subject rising above the shared
boundaries of tradition. Every interpretive recovery of a positive law
is grounded in the interpretive horizon of the community and thus
entails a simultaneous articulation of (historically conditioned)
material law. Dallmayr describes the hermeneutical ethic implicit in
his account by borrowing an example from Gadamer. A despotic
leader who governs according to subjective whim destroys the rule of
law by turning a deaf ear to the "common reasonableness that is the
nourishing soil of legal rule-governance."27
Stanley Fish rebuts Dallmayr by arguing that even despots
necessarily act within the interpretive bounds of the community, and
therefore despots equally are exposed to the destabilizing effects of
shared meanings regardless of their attentiveness to public reasonableness. 28 Fish explains that despotic rule maintained through a
violent reign of terror "energizes and authorizes resentments," and
therefore the "possibility of correction and reform . .. can never be
foreclosed."29 Fish correctly observes that the despot can never escape
from the intersubjective web of his community, but surely Fish cannot
seriously be arguing that The Federalist Papers and Orwelrs 1984
describe societies that are equally hermeneutically grounded. To do so
would embrace what Dallmayr characterizes as "placid consensualism."30 The bloody historical battle to secure the rule of law, the agonies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and the prepackaged public
discourse of advanced capitalism all militate against adopting the
comforting vision that the only matter of importance is the
(unavoidable) existence of an overriding interpretive community.
The disagreement between Dallmayr and Fish grows out of
their polar conceptions of the historical dimension of interpretation.
Dallmayr follows Gadamer by arguing that history is always an unfolding event that can take new and unexpected turns. In contrast,

26.

Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law, in Legal Hermeneutics at 19 (cited in note

27.

Id. at 20.

3).
28. Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in Legal Hermeneutics at 297, 30506 (cited in note 3).
29. Id. at 305-06.
30. Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law, in Legal Hermeneutica at 19 (cited in note
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Fish regards the legal tradition as a "complex mechanism"31 that regenerates itself by following through on present potentialities in
undetermined ways. Dallmayr recognizes that something dramatically new can intervene in history, whereas Fish believes that the
(admittedly undetermined) future is already contained within the
present. Although Fish properly notes that legal change never comes
from an outside agent, a hermeneutical approach to the rule of law
suggests ways to promote a more authentic renewal of tradition than
would occur under a despotic regime. Fish's theoretical claim that
there is always "room for the interpretive maneuvering that produces
change"32 is meaningless without a corresponding political commitment to actualize this potentiality.
Drawing from the essays by Goodrich, Farr, and Dallmayr, one
can distill the historical dimension of contemporary hermeneutics into
two general lessons. First, our attitudes about legal interpretation
must be viewed as historically defined perspectives rather than as
components of a rationally compelled edifice. Descriptions of how we
interpret legal texts necessarily are the product of past socio-political
contexts, in which our legal tradition developed, and the ongoing
process of reinterpreting this culture. By concluding with Goodrich
and Farr that our current dogmas are defined historically, we already
have adopted a critical posture that can lead us to accept a different
range of activities as legitimate within the ongoing practice.
A second lesson of contemporary hermeneutics is that practical
interpretive acts are historically defined no less than our theoretical
self-understanding. Every interpretation is a historical event because
an existing text is redefined in the context of the present. We never
read a text as if for the first time, outside of all contexts. We are
always in the process of giving shape to a historical trajectory of
meaning.
Dallmayr demonstrates that this characteristic of
interpretation enables law-governed activity, which is something
different than adherence to a predefined positive rule. This theme is
pursued in greater detail and with regard to a wider range of issues in
the essays that discuss the theory of contemporary hermeneutics.

31.
32.

Fish, Play of Surfaces, in Legal Hermeneutics at 306 (cited in note 3).
Id.
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III. THEORY
A. The Universalityof the HermeneuticalSituation
The hermeneutical situation of the interpreter that opens the
possibility for the rule of law should not be regarded as a feature
peculiar to legal interpretation. If a core theoretical premise of contemporary hermeneutics exists, it is the universality of the hermeneutical situation. Leyh, therefore, appropriately includes contributions
from the domains of literary, theological, and legal hermeneutics in
the volume. Contemporary hermeneutics describes how understanding occurs and therefore is relevant to each of these disciplines, although theorists traditionally have regarded them as discrete subjects
dealing with particular concerns.
Gerald Bruns poses a question familiar in the domain of literary theory-what is a "text"?-in an effort to advance the current
stalemate in legal theory.* Bruns characterizes current legal theory
as a bipolar opposition between scholars in the mold of Ronald
Dworkin and those in the mold of Peter Goodrich. To address the
threat of relativism, Dworkin defends the idea that right answers
exist for every legal dispute; in contrast, Goodrich argues that slavish
adherence to past practice is never compelled because legal language
3
Bruns rejects both of these approaches
is thoroughly indeterminate4.
because they are predicated on unrealistic assumptions about legal
texts. Bruns follows Dallmayr by arguing that every interpretation
involves application and links this insight to a general theoretical
approach to textuality.
Bruns emphasizes that the dissemination of culture occurs
through language and that language is open and indeterminate rather
than a monological unfolding and clarification of static ideas. Reducing language to a written text does not stabilize the dynamic openness
of language. The text always remains provocative; it never becomes a
transparent carrier of past cultural resolutions. In particular, our
textually based legal tradition is "an always highly charged environment of intersecting (bisecting and dissecting) dialogues in which the
very idea of law itself is in constant revision-in play as hermeneuticians say, contested, irreducible, resistant to conceptual determina-

33. Gerald L. Bruns, Law and Language: A Hermeneutics of the Legal Text, in Legal
Hermeneutics at 23 (cited in note 3).
34. Id. at 23-25.
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tion, always in question, open to unforeseen contextualizations." 5
Consequently, legal hermeneutics is best regarded as an event, the
exploration of the rich openness of language in different contexts,
rather than a theory that can determine for us what the interpretation
of a particular text will reveal.,3 In response to Goodrich's claim that
legal texts are repressive because they paper over indeterminacy,
Bruns argues that legal texts are the embodiment of this "freedom of
linguisticality" 7 inasmuch as they are sites of unsettling hermeneutical events rather than vessels for predefined concepts.
Contemporary hermeneutics establishes a shared ontological
description of the manner in which interpreters of both literary and
legal texts reach understanding. However, hermeneutics originally
developed as a methodological subdiscipline of theology. Although the
stakes may appear higher when one is interpreting sacred scripture
rather than novels or statutes, contemporary hermeneutics nevertheless has had a profound influence on biblical hermeneutics by questioning even this doctrinal boundary. Jerry Stone brings Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics to bear on one of the central debates in
38
theology: the significance of scripture for religious belief and action.
Current theological debate coalesces around a bipolar opposition
similar to that found in legal theory, an opposition pitting the tradition of exegesis against that of interpretation. Biblical exegesis attempts to recover the closed historical meaning of the resurrection,
treating it as an object of reflection for contemporary believers.3 9 In
contrast, biblical interpretation involves demythologizing the text
from its prescientific linguistic meaning so that it can speak to the
existential distress of the enlightened contemporary believer. 40

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 34.
Jerry H. Stone, Christian Praxis as Reflective Action, in Legal Hermeneutics at 103

(cited in note 3).
39. Stone regards Karl Barth's theology as exemplary of this approach because Barth
insists that praxis as reflective action respect the object on which it reflects.... Whereas
culture and language are the necessary forms through which the Christian subject matter

is conveyed, for Barth no such culture and language - biblical, modern, or otherwise - can
circumscribe the divine subject matter to which it points.... Barth distinguishes between
the meaning to which the biblical text points and its particular significance for the
Christian community at any one time.

Id. at 111, 113, 114.
40. Stone regards Rudolph Bultmann's theology as exemplary of this approach. Bultmann
argues that the "modern vision of a closed physical universe governed by natural law permeates
the modern horizon, which means that the biblical description of supernatural spirits as entities
who intervene in daily human affairs can carry no real meaning for the modern interpreter. The
text cannot mean until it is re.presented in terms of existentialist experience." Id. at 109
(emphasis in original).
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Stone argues that Gadamer's hermeneutics rejects the transcendental elevation of either subjective angst or historical event by
recognizing that every exegetical act is interpretive. According to this
view, we can never abruptly distance ourselves from the traditional
text by achieving a thoroughly contemporary interpretation, but neither can we look through the text to the historical Christ event.
Gadamer's hermeneutics suggests that Christian reflective action
(praxis) might "bring the past into the present in a way that on the
one hand does not present it as a heteronomous authority abstracted
from another age and on the other does not relativize it in the excessive desire to join the modern age." 4 1 This mediation, though, presumes a common strand of culture subtending the interpretive effort,
which is captured in the notion of the "communal body of Christ."42
Once again, the historicity of understanding locates interpretation as
an event between the text and reader and discredits every attempt to
privilege either of these (wrongly) presumed distinct entities.
Finally, Drucilla Cornell writes as a legal academic drawing on
themes of contemporary French philosophy and psychology. 43 Cornell
identifies with poststructuralist thought rather than hermeneutics,
but she challenges the Americanized practice of deconstruction that
destroys the possibility of ethics as part and parcel of rejecting any
manner of foundationalism. In response to deconstructive nihilism,
Cornell rehabilitates ethics as a call to the "Good" within historical
practice, but she rejects a neo-Hegelian approach that would posit an
immanent rationality unfolding in history. Rather, legal practice
is
the use of practical reason to balance competing demands and perspectives by proposing legal principles as articulations that define the
Good within a particular context. If "we cannot escape the appeal to
the Good as we interpret legal sentences," 44 then every interpretive
event involves an unsettling of received wisdom and involves an ethical responsibility on the part of the interpreter. "Interpretation is
transformation, and as we interpret, we are responsible for the direction of that transformation." 45
The essays by Cornell, Stone, and Bruns demonstrate that
literary, biblical, and legal hermeneutics are united ontologically by
the experience of understanding within language. Each discipline is
simply a different manifestation of the manner in which we under41. Id. at 121.
42. Id.
43. Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthous The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility
of Legal Interpretation, in Legal Hermeneutics at 147 (cited in note 3).
44. Id. at 150.
45. Id. at 170.
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stand. Contemporary hermeneutics is defined by the claim that understanding is achieved only through application; there is no freefloating interpretation that only later is brought to bear in a particular context. Whether we seek the meaning of a literary text, the
meaning of scripture, or the meaning of a law, the hermeneutical
situation of the interpreter remains the same. The interpreter is
pulled beyond the status quo toward an evolving tradition at the same
time that the tradition finds a home in the interpreter's world of
concerns. This universal character of understanding leads us to view
texts, faith, and ethical judgment in a new, shared light.
Stanley Fish responds to the universal claims of contemporary
hermeneutics with his signature observation that our theoretical
interpretation of a particular practice is distinct from and holds no
power over that practice. Fish criticizes Bruns for acknowledging that
law is the play of linguistic surfaces, but then asserting that this position is deeply insightful and holds methodological consequences. In
reply to Cornell's supposition that the never-realized Good transforms
legal practice, Fish argues that there is no "need for anything outside
the system to impel it forward."46 He describes legal practice as a preexisting ensemble of transformative possibilities 47 that does not
depend on theoretical approaches to legal practice. Although Fish
admits that theoretical claims are important to the extent that they
might carry rhetorical weight within legal practice, he rejects the
power of theory to justify, regulate, or change the practice. 48 Careful
reflection leads Fish to conclude that all understanding is historically
conditioned and linguistically mediated, but this flash of insight
immediately dissolves the point of further reflection. According to
Fish, theory is one bold thought: a recognition of its own impotence.
Bruns, Stone, and Cornell are little more than suggestive in
drawing their conclusions, but Fish's criticism levels the important
and interesting issues raised in their essays. Although his attacks on
theory are well taken, Fish mistakenly equates the philosophical
project of contemporary hermeneutics with interpretive theory. We
can distinguish the two by regarding theory as the effort to stand
outside the flux of a practice and to devise a methodological key to the
practice, and philosophy as the labor of thinking within the practice. 49

46.
47.
48.
49.
note 11);

Fish, Play of Surfaces,in Legal Hermeneutics at 312 (cited in note 3).
Id.
Id. at 309.
See Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory at 24-40 (cited in
Steven Mailloux, Rhetorical Hermeneutics, 11 Critical Inquiry 620, 621, 631, 639 n.26

(1985) (arguing that a rhetorical hermeneutics drawing from Gadamer's work resists the

130

VANDERBILT LAW REVEW

[Vol. 47:115

Contemporary hermeneutics is a philosophical effort to recover the act
of understanding, working within the admittedly narrow confines of
postmodern philosophy.-5
Contemporary hermeneutics does not
deliver a theoretical picture of how we understand texts as a prologue
to developing a methodology for acquiring knowledge about particular
texts. Rather, contemporary hermeneutics recognizes that truth is an
ongoing project structured by dynamic, unfolding historical practices
and therefore concludes that no methodology can ever stand apart
from ongoing practices to guarantee truthful knowledge.51 One can
best explain how contemporary hermeneutics proposes to energize
interpretive practice without claiming to provide a theoretically
grounded methodology by turning to a familiar debate in legal
hermeneutics: the debate over originalist jurisprudence.
B. Legal Theory: The Dispute Over Originalism
Legal scholars have grown accustomed to an apparently intractable political battle. On one side of the battlefield, conservative
partisans urge that constitutional restrictions on government
authority should be interpreted to mean what the white, male,
propertied framers intended them to mean when they were drafted
and ratified. Squared off against the conservatives, liberals urge that
the Constitution holds enlightened meaning for our contemporary
society that can rise above the prejudices of the past. It should be
obvious that Bruns's description of legal texts, Stone's outline of
Christian praxis, and Cornell's affirmation of the transformative
character of interpretation all describe the activity of understanding
in a way that holds significance for this battle over originalism. Contemporary hermeneutics rejects the false alternative of construing
meaning either as a closed historical fact or the product of
contemporary creative reconstruction.
Describing the new path
charted by contemporary hermeneutics reveals numerous potential
pitfalls. Several contributors to the volume assess the value of contemporary hermeneutics by discussing the problems posed by originalism.

"theoretical urge"). I understand Gregory Leyh's use of "theory" to be synonymous with the use of
"philosophy' in the text.
50. I have suggested this role for postmodern legal philosophy. See Francis J. Mootz Ill,
Postmodern Constitutionalismas Materialism, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 515 (1992)..
51. The title of Gadamer's magnum opus, Truth and Method, is therefore somewhat
deceptive inasmuch as the point of his book is to demonstrate that the methodological approach of
science does not grant privileged access to truth.
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Terence Ball criticizes originalism as an imprudent, -although
plausible, interpretive methodology. 52 Ball agrees that judges can
recover the original meaning of the framers' words by resuscitating
the "particular view of politics and human nature" that subtended
"the world of words within which intentions were initially framed."5
But even if this historical inquiry is successful, Ball argues that judges
are unjustified in attempting to use these foreign intentions from the
past to guide current legal practice.5 Ball's normative argument is
familiar to legal scholars and practitioners: we should disregard the
framers' intentions because in many cases they are the product of an
outmoded worldview that no longer can serve as a legitimate guide for
modern society.
The familiarity of his argument should give reason to pause: if
Ball correctly describes the significance of contemporary hermeneutics, it is unclear whether hermeneutical insight adds anything to the
legal battle over originalism. In fact, Ball's argument diverges from
contemporary hermeneutics by accepting the premises of nineteenthcentury romantic hermeneutics (an empathetic appropriation of past
eras avoids misunderstandings) and historicism (historical facts are
closed and determinant entities), although he does argue that a
prudent legal practice should not pursue these hermeneutical
strategies. In sharp contrast, contemporary hermeneutics represents
a break from these related traditions and suggests a new attitude
toward all historical knowledge, including an attempt to understand
what the drafters of a document intended it to mean.5 As Gregory
Leyh notes, from a Gadamerian perspective originalism is not simply
an imprudent methodology; it is a "hermeneutical howler." Viewing
original intent as an immutable historical fact that can be recovered
52. Terence Ball, Constitutional Interpretation and Conceptual Change, in Legal
Hermeneuticsat 129 (cited in note 3).
53. Id. at 133, 137. Ball contends only that it is possible to recover and reanimate past
conceptual schemes as a theoretical matter. He notes that constitutional originalism still faces a
number of thorny practical problems. Id. at 138-43. Ball concludes that '[o]riginalism is not so
much impossible as it is misguided in its aims and unworkable in practice." Id. at 136.
54. Ball writes that we 'can recover those intentions, but we cannot return to them and
make them our own" because to do so is 'a retrograde move that we cannot rationally make." Id.
at 135, 130. Ball makes the familiar argument that judges and legal historians pursue
hermeneutically distinct inquiries, a claim that Gadamer challenges directly. Gadamer, Truth
and Method at 325-27 (cited in note 3).
55. Gadamer's efforts in Truth and Method focus primarily on redefining hermeneutics in
an effort to expunge the effects of romanticism, which was closely intertwined with historicism.
Gadamer, Truth and Method at 171-264 (cited in note 3) (arguing that the historicity of
understanding renders romantic hermeneutics fundamentally suspect because of its historicist
underpinnings).
56. Gregory Leyh, Legal Education and the Public Life, in Legal Hermeneutics at 269, 285
(cited in note 3).
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by a contemporary interpreter ignores the historical dimension of all
understanding. Ball discounts the original intentions and instead
lodges all authority in the contemporary demystifying cogito of the
critical historian. This approach is precisely the move that Gadamer
regards as symptomatic of the Enlightenment's denigration of the
force of tradition.
At first glance, it may appear that even those who are attuned
to the lessons of contemporary hermeneutics add nothing to the existing debate because they tend simply to replicate the political battle
with fancier terms. On one side, Steven Knapp, Walter Benn
Michaels, and Stanley Fish argue that the meaning of a text is defined
by authorial intent; therefore, they conclude, the idea of an evolving
meaning simply is incoherent. 57 On the other side, David Hoy argues
the Gadamerian response: no fixed authorial meaning is possible
because meaning is known only in the application of the text by an
interpreter in the present.5 However, a closer inspection of the debate
reveals that the contestants have moved beyond the romantic and
historicist assumptions of nineteenth-century hermeneutics, which
underlie the unproductive traditional views that continue to frame the
debate about originalism in legal circles.
Knapp and Michaels effectively demonstrate that their position
is far removed from conservative legal theory and its efforts to
rehabilitate and enforce the original meaning of legal texts. They
argue that textual meaning is equivalent to authorial intention, but
they deny that any distinct political or methodological consequences
flow from their theoretical position. Knapp and Michaels contend that
the lack of a "useful interpretive method" makes "deciding what
counts as the best historical evidence" of the author's intent impossible. 59 In this respect they echo Gadamer's principal theme: the
truth of a textual tradition can never be secured by rigorous
application of a neutral methodology. Although contending as a
theoretical matter that the author's intent fixes the meaning of a legal
text, as a practical matter they acknowledge that the application of
57.

Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, Intention, Identity and the Constitution: A

Response to David Hoy, in Legal Hermeneutics at 187, 187 (cited in note 3) (arguing that 'what
the interpreter wants to know, if she wants to know the meaning of 'equal' in the equal protection
clause, can only be what its authors meant by it'); Fish, Play of Surfaces, in Legal Hermeneutic8
at 299-300 (claiming that "there is only one style of interpretation-the intentional style ...
interpretation always and necessarily involves the specification of intention').
58. David Couzens Hoy, Intentions and the Law: Defending Hermeneutic8, in Legal
Hermeneutics at 173, 178 (arguing that "since textual meaning is not reducible to intended
meaning, there are many other kinds of questions that can be asked abouttexts').
59. Knapp and Michaels, Intention, Identity and the Constitution, in Legal Hermeneutics at
196 (cited in note 57).

LEGAL HERMENEUTICS

1994]

the text to certain cases will reflect the beliefs of the contemporary
interpreter. As an example of this distinction, they argue that the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equality is
synonymous with the drafters' intentions (for example, government
schools should provide equal education). However, they argue further
that contemporary interpreters are not constrained to apply the text
according to the drafters' beliefs (for example, segregated schooling is
not inherently unequal). According to this view, it makes sense to
argue "that a court remains faithful to the authors' intentions even
while going againstthe authors' beliefs." 60
In his challenge to Knapp and Michaels, Hoy does not simply
side with liberal legal theorists who argue that courts must
consciously refashion outmoded laws if the law is to serve progressive
social interests. Hoy rejects the idea of a fixed textual meaning
defined by the author's intent that is later subject to varying applications in different contexts. Hoy follows Gadamer's ontological argument that textual meaning can never exist outside of a context-that
is to say, outside of an application of the text. He also charges that
Knapp and Michaels forsake this actual practice in order to defend "an
abstract, theoretical picture" of interpretation.6 1 A contemporary
interpreter seeking to understand the author's intent embedded in a
written text is not seeking to apprehend a brute fact sealed in the
past; instead, the interpreter reanimates the text within her own
context of concerns and questions. Every interpretation is shaped by
intervening history. We should acknowledge that this fact is not a
limitation on knowledge but rather is an unavoidable constitutive
of understanding that holds normative implications for pracfeature
tice.6 2
It is difficult not to conclude that the contestants are talking
past each other. For example, each side considers whether marks in
the sand randomly created by ocean waves should be considered a
meaningful text if the marks happen to replicate intelligible
sentences. Hoy argues that these improbable marks indeed are
meaningful to the interpreter, notwithstanding the complete absence

60.

Id. at 193 (emphasis in original).

Stanley Fish goes so far as to claim that the

"originalist" position is vacuous in practical terms because the authors' intentions in drafting a
legal text could be defined to mean almost anything. Fish, Play of Surfaces, in Legal
Hermeneutics at 298 (cited in note 3). More importantly, the authors' interpretation of past
intentions are accorded no privilege in the effort to recover those intentions. Id. at 300.
Hoy, Intentions and the Law, in Legal Hermeneutics at 174 (cited in note 3).
61.

62.

Id. at 184.
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of authorial intent.6 3 Knapp and Michaels counter that without an
intended meaning there is no meaning: the interpreter comes to
realize her mistake and then acknowledges that the marks apparently
forming words are in fact meaningless.64
This apparently silly dispute underscores that the essays
undertake two different projects. Hoy plainly regards textual interpretation as a particular interpretive comportment that is subtended
by a broader, open hermeneutical situation productive of all
knowledge. Even if the marks in the sand appeared as random lines,
the perception of them relies upon a prefiguring interpretive relationship that is operative in all understanding.65
This prefiguring
relationship thoroughly affects all understanding, including the explicit interpretation of ambiguous texts, rendering it impossible to
speak of meaningful authorial intentions that remain immune from
this relationship.
In contrast, Knapp and Michaels appear to focus on the more
limited question of the theoretical bounds of legitimate textual interpretation, recognizing that an understanding of the text is dependent
on determining, at some level of generality, what the author meant.
As Stanley Fish emphasizes, a judge who utterly disregards the intended meaning of a legal text and instead exploits its linguistic ambiguity has abandoned the effort to understand the text. For Fish, the
concept of authorial intent secures the legitimacy of a local interpretive practice rather than providing an ontological description of
understanding. The judge who abandons authorial intent is "not
trying to figure out what [the text] means but trying to see what
meanings it could be made to yield,"66 which is to say that the judge is
not engaged in a legitimate (originalist) interpretive activity. 7
One might be tempted, then, to accept Hoy's argument that
philosophical hermeneutics extends beyond the limited domain of
textual interpretation without discrediting Knapp and Michaels's
insistence that, in the limited case of textual intrpretation, legitimate
63. Hoy explains that the hermeneutical approach "does not exclude questions about
intention when these are relevant to interpretation, but it believes that since textual meaning is
not reducible to intended meaning, there are many other kinds of questions that can be asked
about texts." Id. at 178.
64. Knapp and Michaels, Intention,Identity and the Constitution,in Legal Hermeneutica at
190 (cited in note 3).
65. Gadamer argues that perception is a hermeneutical event as part of his efforts to
discredit the empiricist tradition that underwrites much of the ideological commitment to
scientific methodology as the guarantor of knowledge. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 89-92
(cited in note 3). See also Patrick A. Heelan, Space-Perceptionand the Philosophyof Science 1 (U.
Cal., 1983).e
66. Fish, Play of Surfaces, in Legal Hermeneuticsat 302 (cited in note 3).
67. Id. at 303.
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interpretation in principle always involves an effort to explicate the
author's intent. Knapp and Michaels offer a theoretical point without
methodological consequences, but framed as a question of legitimacy
rather than ontology, this theoretical point carries significant
rhetorical weight. According to this view, the legitimacy of the legal
system is premised on the adherence to the intended meaning of
authoritative texts. The texts are considered authoritative precisely
because the public has consented to be governed according to the
directives first enunciated in the texts. If the judge is not looking to
the intended meaning of a legal text at some level of generality, is not
the judge in fact abandoning the law in favor of her own prejudices
and sensibilities? Hoy fails to drive home Gadamer's argument in
response to this more circumscribed reading of Knapp and Michaels's
argument. 8 Gadamer claims that the author's intended meaning
never exists apart from the inquiries arising in the present, and thus
ascribing central importance to something that does not, and cannot,

exist for us as an unchanging thing-in-itself is meaningless. 69 The
distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism is entirely specious because we always incorporate the text's meaning but we also
70
never leave that meaning unchanged.
68. Hoy does not drive home the argument in the sense that he does not emphasize it. Hoy
has clearly aligned himself with Gadamer's point that the supposed distinction between
originalism and nonoriginalism is illusory. See Hoy, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. at 491-95 (cited in note 10).
69. Gadamer argues that all understanding is a mediation of the 'unity of meaning"
displayed by the text, its historical effect, and the present-day concerns of the interpreter.
Gadamer, Truth and Method at 576 (cited in note 3). 'The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to
the interpreter, does not depend on the contingencies of the author and his original audience. It
certainly is not identical with them, for it is always co-determined also by the historical situation
of the interpreter and hence by the totality of the objective course of history." Id. at 296.
Gadamer further argues, "When we try to understand a text, we do not try to transpose ourselves
into the author's mind.... If we want to understand, we will try to make his arguments even
stronger.... That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive
activity as well." Id. at 292, 296. It is important to recognize that Gadamer's point is not limited
to textual interpretation, but extends to the historicity of all human experience. Thus, the
argument against authorial intent is made as a specific feature of Gadamer's general critique of
historicism:
Is it a correct description of the art of historical understanding to say that we learn to
transpose ourselves into alien horizons? Are there such things as closed horizons, in this
sense?... Everything contained in historical consciousness is in fact embraced by a single
historical horizon. Our own past and that other past toward which our historical
consciousness is directed help to shape this moving horizon out of which human life
always lives and which determines it as heritage and tradition.... Transposing ourselves
[into a historical situation] consists neither in the empathy of one individual for another
nor in subordinating another person to our own standards; rather, it always involves
rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that
of the other.
Id. at 304, 305.
70. Gadamer writes:
Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it ourselves
inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further
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Knapp and Michaels are correct to focus on intentionality,
Gadamer would assert, but they err by reducing intentionality from
the force of received tradition to the singular person of the author. To
unpack this idea, it is helpful to consider Gadamer's distinction between the idea of pure aesthetic appreciation and the experience of
art.7' Gadamer argues that it is a mistake to reduce the experience of
art to an immediate aesthetic response founded on a "mysterious
intimacy" between the observer and the artwork that amounts to an
ahistorical "encounter with ourselves."2 Art is meaningful because it
is defined by cultural history. In contrast, "natural beauty does not
'say' anything in the sense that works of art, created by and for men,
say something."73 At first glance, one might extrapolate that Gadamer
would agree with Knapp and Michaels that the random marks in the
sand cannot mean anything. However, Gadamer emphasizes that
authorial intent does not constitute the "saying" of art: "Naturally it
is not the artist who is speaking here. The artist's own comments
about what is said in one or another of his works may certainly be of
possible interest .... [However], the experience of the work of art
leaves the mens auctoris behind it."74 Gadamer joins Hegel in subordetermine it ourselves .... Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text goes
beyond its author. That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a
productive activity as well.... It is enough to say that we understand in a different way,
if we understandat all.
Id. at 293, 296-97 (emphasis in original). As the last sentence underscores, Gadamer believes that
translation is a model of all understanding:
[Tihe hermeneutically enlightened consciousness seems to me to establish a higher truth
in that it draws itself into its own reflection. Its truth, namely, is that of translation. It is
higher because it allows the foreign to become one's own, not by destroying it critically or
reproducing it uncritically, but by explicating it within one's own horizons with one's own
concepts and thus giving it new vitality. Translation allows what is foreign and what is
one's own to merge in a new form by defending the point of the other even if it be opposed
to one's own view.
Gadamer, PhilosophicalHermeneuticsat 94 (cited in note 11).
Paul Campos recently has renewed his defense of Knapp and Michaels's strong intentionalism
by claiming that Gadamer hypostatizes the text as an "autonomous entity that has escaped from
both its initial author and its subsequent readers." Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire
Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal Text, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1065, 1086 (1993). Gadamer's
model of translation avoids this very error by demonstrating that a text never escapes either
factor in the history of its effects. Gadamer's refusal to accept the autonomy of the text is the
focus of his critique of Emilio Betti's hermeneutics. See Gadamer, Truth and Method at 324-30
(cited in note 3) (critiquing Betti's fundamental distinction between judge and legal historian as a
mistaken bifurcation of intentional meaning and cultural significance); Weinsheimer,
PhilosophicalHermeneutics and Literary Theory at 11-13 (cited in note 11) (tracing Gadamer's
argument that Betti's intentionalist effort to avoid "subjectivism" reinscribes the subject-object
framework).
71. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics at 95-104 (cited in note 11). In this essay,
Gadamer both summarizes and sharpens his analysis in the first part of Truth and Method.
72. Id. at95.
73. Id. at 97.
74. Id. at 102-03.

1994]

LEGAL HERMENEUTICS

137

dinating aesthetic appreciation to the experience of art, inasmuch as
an appreciation of the aesthetics of nature belongs "to the context that
is stamped and determined by the artistic creativity of a particular
time."16 The tradition of artistic creativity within which the viewer is
enmeshed defines the aesthetics of both nature and the artwork. The
artwork is always taken beyond the particular artist's original intent,
but aesthetic meaning never exists outside the intentionalist context
of human creativity. 6
Traditional accounts of legal legitimacy are rendered pr6blematic if Knapp and Michaels are in error to suppose, even as a theoretical matter, that the intentions of the text's author are the focus of
interpretation. Ken Kress directly addresses whether legal interpretation retains its legitimacy once we accept the lessons of contemporary hermeneutics. 77 Drawing from Gadamer's philosophy, Kress
contends that legal texts are only moderately indeterminate because
the shared context of an evolving tradition limits the range of interpretive options. 78 However, Kress concedes that even moderate indeterminacy destroys legal legitimacy if legitimacy is premised on a
hypothetical original consent to the meaning that a legal text holds at
the time it is created, because subsequent governmental action can
always exceed the limits of the articulated consent by exploiting the
linguistic indeterminacy of the governing text.79 Consequently, legal
legitimacy is threatened by the demise of originalism only because
traditionally we link legitimacy with a consent theory of government.
Kress argues that consent is only one route to legitimacy; alternative
theories such as the duty to uphold just institutions, fraternity, and
social utility also legitimize government power. 80 Although contemporary hermeneutics requires us to rethink legal legitimacy, it does
not foreclose legal legitimacy.

75. Id. at 98.
76. Gadamer explains that when 'something natural is regarded and enjoyed as beautiful, it
is not a timeless and wordless givenness of the 'purely aesthetic' object that has its exhibitive
ground in the harmony of forms and colors and symmetry of design, as it might seem to a
Pathagorizing, mathematical mind." Id. at 98. This argument derives from Gadamer's central
premise that 'being that can be understood is language." Id. at 103. See also Gadamer, Truth
and Method at 383-491 (cited in note 3).
77. Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in Legal Hermeneutics at 200 (cited in
note 3).
78. Id. at 202.03.
79. Id. at 205. Compare James A. Gardner, The PositivistFoundationsof Originalism: An
Account and Critique, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (arguing that a Lockean notion of popular
sovereignty as government by consent of the governed does not require adherence to originalist
interpretive methodology).
80. Kress, Legal Indeterminacy,in Legal Hermeneuticsat 206-10 (cited in note 3).
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What, then, is the ramification of contemporary hermeneutics
for legal practice, especially with regard to the debate over originalism? Just this: the originalist debate must be scuttled in law reviews
and court opinions alike, and a new discussion of legal practice that is
attentive to the hermeneutical situation must renew the legitimacy of
legal practice by describing the dynamic tension of that practice.
Although Gadamer is famous for his invective against the Enlightenment prejudice that true knowledge only comes as the product of a
rigorous application of scientific method, we should not equate his
challenge of methodology with an accepting quietism of the status
quo. Gadamer argues that understanding is a function of our historicity, defined by the finitude of human existence, and involves a fusion
of the horizons constituting the text and reader. Understanding involves the fusion of these horizons and, therefore, is never the passive
reception of past meanings. Instead, understanding approaches the
full realization of conversation, "in which something is expressed that
is not only mine or my author's, but common."", Informed by this
hermeneutical insight, lawyers, judges, and scholars can realign legal
rhetoric to comport with its hermeneutical basis. The goal of such a
project is not to prescribe the proper way to practice law, but to reinvigorate the ongoing practice of law.
The essays regarding
hermeneutical practice provide indications of how this modest yet
important goal might be pursued.
IV. PRACTICE
Michael Perry contends in his essay that the theoretical dispute over the merits of originalism holds real world consequences for
the practice of law; in short, that "constitutional theory matters to
constitutional practice" because it "can make a radical difference in
constitutional doctrine." 2 Perry admits that a simplistic view of constitutional theory as an algorithm dictating specific decisions is misplaced, but argues that competing schools of interpretive theory shape
legal practice to the extent that judges and lawyers rely on these
schools to legitimate their practice.8
Stanley Fish challenges Perry's thesis as part of his broader
attack on the efficacy of any theory. Fish claims that originalist

81. Gadamer, Truth and Method at 388 (cited in note 3).
82. Michael J. Perry, Why Constitutional Theory Matters to -ConstitutionalPractice (and
Vice Versa), in Legal Hermeneutics at 241, 241, 253 (cited in note 3).
83. Id. at 256-57.
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judges are criticized for the consequences flowing from their actual
decisions, not because the theory of originalism means anything determinate or is in some way incorrect.8 But this response highlights the
very point that Perry makes. When a mode of legal practice is
discredited, the underlying theory of interpretation also is questioned,
because theory is useful only to the extent that it legitimates the
features of good legal practice.s If adjudicative practice renders
originalist justifications suspect, the unavoidable effort to articulate
better justifications for future legal decisions in turn affects legal
practice. Perry argues that there is continuous feedback between
legitimating theory and legal practice. Each shapes the other when
participants in legal practice use the anticipated results in future
cases to justify their adherence to a particular interpretive theory or
when they use a particular interpretive theory to justify their conclusions about a particular case.8
Perry's argument is strengthened by invoking Gadamer's more
detailed analysis. Perry falls victim to the idea that originalism and
nonoriginalism describe two different, equally plausible, phenomenological accounts of judging, and that prudence commends the
latter approach.87 Gadamer persuasively demonstrates that no judge
can recover pristine original intentions unaffected by the intervening
effects of the tradition of interpreting these intentions, but neither can
a judge distance herself from the tradition that quite literally is embodied by the text. Choosing nonoriginalism over originalism often is
an empty act because neither theory captures the hermeneutical situation. However, the practical effect of acknowledging the hermeneutical situation and eschewing the originalism debate altogether promises to be significant. The practice of law might be transformed if
judges and lawyers acknowledge and espouse what they exhibit in
their performative comportment within legal culture: legal meaning
is a historical project rather than an independent essence or the product of an assertion of subjective will. Contemporary hermeneutics
counsels participants in a tradition to put themselves at risk before
the tradition, which results, of course, in also putting the tradition at
84. Fish, Playof Surfaces, in Legal Hermeneuticsat 298 (cited in note 3).
85. Perry, Why ConstitutionalTheory Matters,in Legal Hermeneutics at 257.
86. Id. at 258.
87. See Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional"Interpretation,"58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 551, 569-71 (1985). See also id. at 602 (asserting
in an appendix to the article that "[o]riginalism is a real option) (emphasis in original).
Gadamerian critiques of Perry on this point include Mootz, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 545-56 (cited in note
10); Fred Dallmayr, Nature and Community: Comments on Michael Perry, 63 Tulane L. Rev.
1405, 1414 (1989); Hoy, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. 479 (cited in note 10); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism
as TransformativePolitics,63 Tulane L. Rev. 1599, 1603-21 (1989).
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risk before their prejudiced horizons.
Gadamer declares that
contemporary hermeneutics describes a way of experience rather than
a method of inquiry, and that the highest hermeneutical principle is
"holding oneself open in a conversation."m This position undercuts
both the crude traditionalism of avowed originalists and the
subjectivist chutzpa of avowed nonoriginalists.
In his article, Lief Carter demonstrates that embracing the
hermeneutical situation may not require a profound revolution but
rather simple self-reflection within existing legal practice. 9 Carter
recounts his experience of serving as a discussion facilitator at a retreat of fourteen state court trial judges to confirm the pragmatic
character of adjudicative practice. Carter found that the judges were
quite uninterested in discussing abstract theory as a foundation for
their practice; instead, the practice itself was the topic of conversation
and concern. Although the self-selected group admittedly is not statistically significant,90 Carter concludes generally that judges are more
thoroughly pragmatic in their outlook than legal scholars suppose.91
Judging is the practice of rearticulating the community's tradition in
response to the case at hand, which requires a creative discernment of
"community values and experiences."2 Carter's description of the
judges' attitudes bears striking resemblance to Gadamer's hermeneutical ethic of putting oneself at risk, although Carter conceptualizes
this attitude in terms drawn from the pragmatic tradition in philosophy.
Finally, Gregory Leyh writes convincingly that hermeneutical
themes imparted as part of legal education could bring about significant changes in legal practice. 93 Leyh chronicles the demise of humanist legal education as reflecting important shifts in our conception of
good lawyering. Leyh recounts how our current method of assessing
lawyers according to "the technical proficiency with which they can
work the law" has supplanted the older ideal of the lawyer as an important participant in the intellectual and political life of the commu88.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships

189 (MIT, 1985) (Robert R.

Sullivan, trans.).
89. Lief H. Carter, How Trial Judges Talk Speculations About Foundationalism and
Pragmatism in Legal Culture, in Legal Hermeneutics at 219 (cited in note 3).
90. Id. at 222-24.
91.
Carter summarizes this point by recalling that 'storytelling more than analytical debate
marked our conversations." Id. at 221. I interpret this evaluation to mean that judges, as a
community, develop shared narratives about their exercise of power that reflect the
hermeneutical situation described by Gadamer much more than the formalist pretense of
traditional jurisprudence.
92. Id. at 228.
93. Leyh, Legal Education and the Public Life, in Legal Hermeneutics at 269 (cited in note
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nity.94 Leyh seeks a renewed understanding and emphasis on the
deep interconnections of legal discourse and the socio-political community in which this discourse takes place. Legal realism was wholly
inadequate to foster such an understanding, in Leyh's estimation,
because it sought only to describe practice rather than to transform
it. 5 Leyh argues that contemporary hermeneutics could form the core
of a revised curriculum that is oriented toward fostering the development of practitioners who have "acquired an understanding of law's
past and of the constitutive connections between law and wider
culture."96 Leyh regards such practitioners as the epitome of good
lawyers, freed from the current pseudo-technical ideology:
Hermeneutics is not a method or program or substantive doctrine. It is
a philosophical activity the aim of which is understanding the way we understand. Hermeneutics sets for itself an ontological task, namely, identifying
the ineluctable relationships between text and reader, past and present, that
allow for understanding to take place at all ....

As legal educators assign

hermeneutical readings or address standard legal analysis from a self-consciously hermeneutical point of view, the likely result will be to enrich legal
learning in a humanistic way. In addition, this
approach will promote the
97
development of the good lawyer described above.

Leyh questions the suggestion that the legal academy be divided into
a two-track system of training Hessians and promoting academic
contemplation.98 It is this bifurcation that contemporary hermeneutics seeks to repair.
Leyh elaborates his theme by describing the impact of distinct
hermeneutical themes on the process of legal education. In view of
the polysemic character of language and the contextual nature of
understanding and reasoning, the law student would be confronted
with the historical character of legal discourse. He believes this
approach to legal education ensures that the student "will be engaged
at the level of justifying legal discourse, not simply describing or
mastering it. Her understanding of the always provisional nature of
knowledge will free her from thinking of legal judgments as references
to black-letter rules or fixed codes."99 Consequently, the student will
learn to appreciate "a rationally defensible way of exercising judgment
that neither appeals to ahistorical, independent standards nor lapses
into the kind of nihilism that threatens the legitimacy of the legal
94.

Id. at 278.

95.
96.

Id. at 276.
Id. at 281.

97.

Id. at 283.

98.

Id.

99.

Id. at 288.
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order." 10° It is productive to link Leyh's argument with Michael
Perry's claims about the significance of constitutional theory.
Contemporary hermeneutical philosophy is not an algorithmic method
that we might choose to adopt, but instead represents a metanarrative about the narratives of legal practice that influences and is
influenced by the local narratives. Learning the law is learning to join
in an ongoing conversation about the terms of social life.
A
hermeneutical orientation could dramatically affect the ways in which
students of the law approach this conversation, just as legal practice
has an important effect on our efforts to articulate a legal
hermeneutics.
V. CONCLUSION

Gregory Leyh has performed an important service by compiling
this volume. As related in this review, the essays frequently return to
the same central themes despite their ostensible differences. This
result is appropriate, for contemporary hermeneutics, in an important
respect, is concerned with only a single topic: the activity of understanding is a historical practice with ontological significance, although
understanding is manifested in numerous venues. So general a concern cannot be monopolized by the parochial interests of legal theorists, as attested by the multi-disciplinary approach that the volume
represents. Leyh makes clear that he is interested in the critical
encounters between philosopher, jurisprude, theologian, and literary
theorist.o1 "Instead of treating law as a discipline separate from the
humanities because of its specialized idiom and professional ethos, law
is understood here as another voice in the larger community's conversation about how to promote a more just and humane politics." 10 2
Perhaps Leyh's essay on the possibility for the transformation
of public life through law and legal education provides the best example of the edifying effect of contemporary hermeneutics. Rather than
striking fear into the hearts of mainstream scholars, the bold assertion of critical legal studies adherents that "law is politics" should lead
us to recall the now-forgotten link of legal reasoning and communal
self-definition. Contemporary hermeneutics emphasizes that the
enterprise of legal decisionmaking is never insulated from our broader
social context. Unleashed from foundationalist groundings, the prac100. Id. at 287.
101. Legal Hermeneutics at xvii (cited in note 3).
102. Id. at xi.

1994]

LEGAL HERMENEUTICS

tice and study of law become challenging engagements of constitutive
politics rather than devolving into a meaningless melange of power
relationships.
Traditional scholars still might enjoy the comfort of Lieber's
nineteenth-century hermeneutics, but this tradition has been eclipsed
by contemporary philosophy and political theory.'03 The legal system
awaits the Francis Lieber of our time, who will translate contemporary hermeneutics into the idiom of ongoing legal practice. The essays
in this volume provide signposts along this as yet unmapped route.
Given our troubled times, it is plain that the contemporary Francis
Lieber can appear on the scene none too soon.

103. Indeed, within Lieber's hermeneutics we see the tensions that are now emphasized in
contemporary hermeneutics. See notes 3,4, 19, and accompanying text.

